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Abstract
Background: During the early stages of a new inﬂuenza pandemic, travel restriction is an immediate and
non-pharmaceutical means of retarding incidence growth. It extends the time frame of eﬀective mitigation, especially
when the characteristics of the emerging virus are unknown. In the present study, we used the 2009 inﬂuenza A
pandemic as a case study to evaluate the impact of regulating air, sea, and land transport. Other government
strategies, namely, antivirals and hospitalizations, were also evaluated.
Methods: Hong Kong arrivals from 44 countries via air, sea, and land transports were imported into a discrete
stochastic Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious and Recovered (SEIR) host-ﬂow model. The model allowed a number of
latent and infectious cases to pass the border, which constitutes a source of local disease transmission. We also
modeled antiviral and hospitalization prevention strategies to compare the eﬀectiveness of these control measures.
Baseline reproduction rate was estimated from routine surveillance data.
Results: Regarding air travel, the main route connected to the inﬂuenza source area should be targeted for travel
restrictions; imposing a 99% air travel restriction delayed the epidemic peak by up to two weeks. Once the pandemic
was established in China, the strong land connection between Hong Kong and China rendered Hong Kong
vulnerable. Antivirals and hospitalization were found to be more eﬀective on attack rate reductions than travel
restrictions. Combined strategies (with 99% restriction on all transport modes) deferred the peak for long enough to
establish a vaccination program.
Conclusion: The ﬁndings will assist policy-makers with decisions on handling similar future pandemics. We also
suggest regulating the extent of restriction and the transport mode, once restriction has been deemed necessary for
pandemic control. Although travel restrictions have yet to gain social acceptance, they allow time for mitigation
response when a new and highly intrusive virus emerges.
Background
When an emerging inﬂuenza virus is introduced to human
populations, the pandemic potential of the virus becomes
a public concern. Policy makers consider diﬀerent inter-
ventions to contain and mitigate incipient pandemic
growth. However, pharmaceutical interventions such as
vaccines are not usually available in the early stage of
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pandemics. Public health measures such as travel restric-
tions then become essential in controlling pandemic
spread.
Novel inﬂuenza A (H1N1), also called swine ﬂu, is a
novel inﬂuenza virus that caused its ﬁrst illness in Mexico
in 2009. Because of insuﬃcient information regarding this
particular infectious agent, the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) declared the event the ﬁrst global H1N1
inﬂuenza pandemic (H1N1pdm) on June 11, 2009. In a
recent study, an estimated 284,500 deaths have been asso-
ciated with H1N1pdm [1]. The high transmissibility of the
virus has heightened public awareness of disease control
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measures. Hong Kong’s large-scale international travel
pattern and high population density renders the Hong
Kong population especially vulnerable. Nearly 300 severe
H1N1 cases and 80 fatal H1N1 cases had been reported
in Hong Kong at the end of the 2010 ﬂu season [2]. The
virus has been widely circulated locally, and lessening the
disease burden now depends on implementing eﬀective
control measures.
The earliest applied H1N1pdm control measure
imposed by the Hong Kong Government was travel
restriction via travel advice and entry screening [3]. For
highly-transmittable infectious diseases such as inﬂuenza,
the traveling patterns of individuals play an essential role
in geographical disease spread. Travel restrictions, a type
of social control measure, have been evaluated in several
epidemics including inﬂuenza [4-7], human immunodeﬁ-
ciency virus (HIV) [8], severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) [6,9], and, recently, the 2009 H1N1pdm [10].
Empirical statistics indicate that the inﬂuenza season was
delayed following reduced ﬂying activity caused by the
US 9/11 incident [11]. Hufnagel et al. [9] further demon-
strated that isolating a mere 2% of the largest cities was
enough to halt the SARS outbreak. Nevertheless, the
WHO considers travel restriction to be impractical in the
majority of countries [12]. In addition, some studies have
disputed the value of air travel restrictions in epidemic
control [6,7,13]. Cooper et al. regarded that beneﬁts
accrued from suspending air travels is limited by the short
serial interval of inﬂuenza. Hollingsworth et al. [6] con-
cluded that containment of a pandemic inﬂuenza strain
requires rigorous travel restrictions and small numbers
of local infectious inhabitants. In Hong Kong, because
the magnitude of travel restrictions imposed by travel
advice and entry screening was small, its eﬀectiveness in
pandemic delay is disputable.
Despite these limitations, the impact of travel restric-
tions requires ongoing investigation. Previous studies
focused on air travel restrictions alone [4,14], but in many
cities, including Hong Kong, air travel is a secondary
means of transport for arriving and departing travelers.
Statistics show that more than half of the passengers arriv-
ing in Hong Kong annually enter by sea or land [15]. As
shown in Figure 1, over ten million visitors per annum
enter Hong Kong via land transport from Asia. Visitors
from North America and Europe constitute a relatively
high proportion of air transport arrivals. Therefore, to
assess the true eﬀectiveness of travel restrictions, air, sea,
and land transport must all be incorporated into the eval-
uation. Additionally, most of the published mathematical
models admit only those latent individuals who travel
between countries. However, with limited screening sensi-
tivity at the entry border points [16,17], a large number of
infected cases could enter, thereby dramatically increasing
the rate of local disease transmission [18].
Figure 1 Total arrival (in millions) by air, sea, and land transport.
Forty-four countries were selected in total which contributed more
than 95% of arrivals to Hong Kong.
Whereas travel restrictions can be imposed almost
immediately, antiviral drugs require extended time for
preparation. In Hong Kong, antiviral and hospitaliza-
tion strategies were implemented about 3.5 months after
the ﬁrst global H1N1pdm import [19]. The main pur-
pose of travel restrictions are to defer the pandemic,
whereas antivirals and hospitalizations aim to reduce
the transmission rate and severity of disease [5]. These
strategies have proven useful in many inﬂuenza epi-
demics, including that of the novel H1N1pdm. Vaccina-
tion alone eﬀectively mitigates most of the epidemics,
by reducing the risk of a susceptible being infected,
and thus the possibility of seeding the disease in the
community. Nevertheless, vaccine design, development
and public administration are lengthy processes. Current
manufacturing capacity is insuﬃcient to produce the vac-
cines within a few months following declaration of an
inﬂuenza pandemic [20]. Hong Kong Government oﬃ-
cials implemented the H1N1 vaccination program about
nine months following the ﬁrst global import [21], by
which time the H1N1pdm had passed its peak. Low public
acceptance of vaccine uptake during theH1N1pdmperiod
compounded the issue. In one study, only 7% of subjects
reported that they were ‘likely/very likely/certain’ to be
vaccinated [22].
Impact of epidemic interventions is usually quantiﬁed
by mathematical models. Clinical trial design is impracti-
cal for assessing the eﬀectiveness of some interventions,
such as face masks and isolation, because of ethical con-
siderations relating to epidemics in general. By using
mathematical models, the epidemic dynamics and inter-
vention eﬀectiveness can be determined. Such models
can evaluate a range of interventions; isolation [23],
quarantine [24], antiviral drugs [25,26], school closures
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[27,28], vaccinations [29,30] and face masks [31], among
others.
In the study, we use the Hong Kong Governmental
response to the 2009 H1N1pdm as a model case study
to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of travel restrictions of dif-
ferent magnitudes and transport modes i.e. air, sea, and
land, combined with other interventions, namely antivi-
rals and hospitalizations, in the event of a novel inﬂuenza
virus. The impact is assessed by simulations from an epi-
demic model. We also investigate the eﬀects of changing
important parameters, including reproduction numbers
in non-local visitors to Hong Kong, screening sensitivity at
entry border points, and date at which travel restrictions
are imposed. The results provide valuable information to




Population data were extracted from the International
Database (IDB), U.S. Census Bureau [32]. The individual
probability of travel for each country was calculated as the
daily travel rate divided by the population size. The arrival
data were extracted from visitor arrival statistics provided
by the Hong Kong Tourism Board [15]. These statistics
include the total number of arrivals by country, together
with their modes of transport. Forty-four countries, col-
lectively contributing more than 95% of annual arrivals to
Hong Kong, were selected for the analysis (Figure 1). The
yearly frequency of departing Hong Kong residents by dif-
ferent transport modes were collected from the Census
and Statistics Department, Hong Kong [33]. The data are
listed in Additional ﬁle 1 and are assumed to be uniformly
distributed on a daily scale.
Disease transmission model
We extended the discrete stochastic SEIR model [34-36]
to study the H1N1pdm dynamics and the impacts of local
interventions. The stochastic approach diﬀers from that
of deterministic models [4,37-41]. In our model, foreign
virus arriving by air, land, and sea transport adapts and
establishes in a local community with inherent uncer-
tainty. Introducing this chance eﬀect into the epidemic
dynamics enhances the realism of the model. The model
outputs are the deferred time period and the illness attack
rate (AR) (deﬁned as the number of new infected cases per
head of population during a given time period).
All individuals in the local population were assumed to
be susceptible, and the average latent and infectious peri-
ods were set to 1.45 and 2.9 days, respectively [10,42].
The population, N, was divided into four classes: suscep-
tible (S(t)); exposed (E(t)); infectious (I(t)); and recovered
(R(t)), at each time point t. Because no information was
available on cross-immunity from past inﬂuenza infec-
tions, the initial population was set at 100% suscepti-
ble. Once susceptible individuals became infected, they
advanced to the latent (non-infectious) stage. Follow-
ing the latent period, they became infectious and could
transmit the disease to other susceptible individuals. A
number of individuals moved to the next compartment
with a deﬁned probability. The number of individuals
advancing to each stage was assumed to follow a binomial
distribution.
Disease transmission from travelers
In the disease transmission model, latent (IMEk (t)) and
infectious (IMIk(t)) travelers arrived from 44 foreign coun-
tries by transport k-th and were assigned to compart-
ments E(t) and I(t), respectively. Because the screening
sensitivity at the border points of entry was limited, a pro-
portion (1− ν) of infectious cases were imported to Hong
Kong, an approach not considered in other global patch
models [7,10]. The number of cases imported to the local
city was also assumed to be binomially distributed, with a
probability equal to the chance of travel via the speciﬁed
transport mode.
To allow for spatial heterogeneities between non-local
countries, case numbers for each country were generated
from discrete time SEIR models assigned independent
reproduction numbers (R0), deﬁned as the average num-
ber of secondary infections induced by a typical infectious
individual in a wholly susceptible population. The magni-
tude of R0 depends on the individual contact rate, disease
transmissibility, and the duration of infectiousness; hence,
R0 is expected to diﬀer between countries. In this paper,
the R0 of foreign countries were estimated by the initial
exponential growth rate method [43] assuming no inter-
vention during the early stage of H1N1pdm. They were
ﬁtted by daily counts of laboratory-conﬁrmed infected
cases in each country, obtained from pandemic H1N1 sit-
uation updates archived in theWorld HealthOrganization
(WHO) [44] and the European Centre for Disease Pre-
vention and Control (ECDC) [45]. Several local exposed
(EXE(t)) and infectious (EXI(t)) cases were removed from
the compartments based on the proportion of travel by
the speciﬁed means of transport. Simulation was started
from the day of initial global import. The eﬀect of varying
the R0s of speciﬁed foreign countries by 20% was per-
formed. The details of disease transmission from travelers
are provided in Additional ﬁle 1.
Control measures
The mathematical model assesses the eﬀectiveness of: (i)
travel restrictions (for diﬀerent transport modes) and (ii)
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local antiviral and hospitalization interventions. Travel
restrictions were supposed to take eﬀect on the day fol-
lowing the ﬁrst global onset case. Diﬀerent start dates
were tested in a sensitivity analysis. The antiviral and the
hospitalization strategies were implemented locally 3.5
months following the ﬁrst global onset case, echoing the
strategies employed by the Department of Health, Hong
Kong [19].
Travel restrictions relating to sea, land, and air travel
We imposed 90% and 99% travel restrictions (fk), on diﬀer-
ent transport modes k. The term ‘travel restriction by fk ’
meant allowing only a fraction of (1− fk) import individu-
als to be transported to Hong Kong from overseas through
transportation k. We also considered only one-third (ν)
of those (1 − fk) imported infectious cases as successfully
identiﬁed positive cases at the entry borders in the base-
line scenario [16]. The screened positive individuals enter-
ing Hong Kong were transported to hospital for further
examination [3]. Conﬁrmed cases were recommended
to undertake voluntary quarantine. We assumed that all
identiﬁed cases accepted voluntary quarantine. Screen-
ing sensitivities of 95% and 5%, and travel-restriction start
dates of three and ﬁve months following the ﬁrst global
import, were also evaluated (Additional ﬁle 1).
Antiviral and hospitalization We assumed that 12%
(pT ) of the infectious subjects were oﬀered antiviral and
6% (pH ) of the infectious subjects were hospitalized, based
on inﬂuenza pandemic records [23,25]. The remaining
82% (pU ) of infectious individuals were untreated. The
antiviral reduces infectiousness (ψ) of individuals by 60%
[46]. Either intervention reduce the average infectious
period by 1.5 days [47]. Compartments for antiviral T(t)
and hospitalization H(t) were developed separately in the
model for individual assessment of the treatments. The
stochastic system is
S(t + t) = S(t) − B(t)




(1 − fk)IMEk (t) − EXE(t) − C(t)




− EXI(t) − D(t) − M(t) − N(t)
T(t + t) = T(t) + M(t) − P(t)
H(t + t) = H(t) + N(t) − Q(t)
R(t + t) = R(t) + D(t) + P(t) + Q(t)
(1)
We denote bin(m, n) as a binomial distribution with
probability m and number of total individuals n. The
distributions of the classes are
B(t) ∼ bin(1 − exp[− βN [ I(t) + (1 − ψ)T(t)
+ H(t)]t] ), S(t))
C(t) ∼ bin(1 − exp(−αt),E(t))
M(t) ∼ bin(pTt, I(t))
N(t) ∼ bin(pHt, I(t))
D(t) ∼ bin(pU [ 1 − exp(−γRt)] , I(t))
P(t) ∼ bin(1 − exp(−γTt),T(t))
Q(t) ∼ bin(1 − exp(−γHt),H(t))
(2)
where β is the disease transmission rate and 1/α is the
average latent period. The probability of a susceptible per-
son becoming infected is 1−exp[−β[ I(t)+(1−ψ)T(t)+
H(t)] /N] during time step t. γR, γT , and γH specify
the removal rates from the infectious state, the antiviral
treatment state, and the hospitalization state, respectively.
The details of the mathematical methodology and the
simulation are provided in Additional ﬁle 1.
Epidemic evolution and baseline scenario
The H1N1pdm is seeded according to the start dates of
each country (listed in Additional ﬁle 1). The earliest epi-
demic was seeded in Mexico on March 11, 2009 [48].
For each country, the number of infected cases was gen-
erated from the discrete-time SEIR model, based on the
estimated reproduction number.
Since the Hong Kong Government conﬁrmed the ﬁrst
imported case of H1N1pdm on May 1, 2009 [49], the
initial numbers of latent cases and infectious cases were
iteratively estimated, thereby minimizing the diﬀerence
between the reported date and the simulated ﬁrst pas-
sage time (FPT). Allowing for stochastic variability, the
baseline transmission rate was estimated for the ﬁrst two
months following the day of the ﬁrst local import, in the
absence of travel restrictions and intervention. Local daily
surveillance of conﬁrmed infected cases (May 1, 2009 to
June 30, 2009) was available from press releases on human
swine ﬂu, published by the Department of Health, Hong
Kong [50]. The range of R0 values encompassed mild and
severe scenarios.
Results
Scenarios with no interventions
The local baseline R0 was estimated at around 1.4. Val-
ues of R0 were chosen to simulate mild (R0 = 1.1) and
severe (R0 = 1.7) inﬂuenza outbreaks in Hong Kong,
and were consistent with those reported in previous stud-
ies [48,51]. In foreign countries, R0 ranged from 1.1 to
1.9. In the baseline scenario (R0 = 1.4), the median FPT
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and ﬁrst one hundred passage time (FHPT) of infected
cases entering Hong Kong were 55 and 90 days, respec-
tively (Table 1). Because the H1N1pdm was initiated in
the Americas, the primary means by which the infected
cases arrived in Hong Kong during the fourth month was
air travel (Figure 2). The number of cases imported by air
transport exceeded that of land transport during the ﬁrst
six months. Thereafter, because the emerging virus had
circulated tomost of the Asian countries, including China,
the number of cases imported by land transport increased
exponentially. Because ships constitute a minor transport
mode to Hong Kong, they delivered few cases throughout
the pandemic period (Figure 2).
In the absence of control measures, and setting Hong
Kong R0 = 1.4, the seven months’ cumulative AR was
close to that of the ﬁnal AR (Figure 3A). In a mild local
scenario (R0 = 1.1), the cumulative AR was a mere 2%
after ﬁve months, and after seven months, had reached
just two-thirds the ﬁnal cumulative AR (Figure 4A). In a
severe local scenario (R0 = 1.7), the H1N1pdm had nearly
terminated after seven months, and the cumulative AR
exceeded 70% (Figure 4E).
Impact of the interventions
Among the three kinds of transport, disease spread was
most eﬀectively delayed by restriction on air travel. Air
Table 1 Median FPTs and FHPTs (in days) with conﬁdence
intervals (CI) at the baseline scenario
Control
measure
Transportation FPT (95% CI) FHPT (95% CI)
No travel
restriction
55 (35, 67) 90 (89, 92)
90% travel
restriction
Air 62 (42, 72) 99 (97, 100)
Sea 56 (34, 67) 92 (90, 93)
Land 58 (44, 69) 93 (91, 95)
Air, Sea 66 (51, 77) 102 (101, 104)
Air, Land 69 (45, 81) 106 (104, 107)
Sea, Land 58 (30, 69) 95 (93, 96)
All transports 94 (88, 98) 114 (114, 115)
99% travel
restriction
Air 61 (37, 72) 99 (97,101)
Sea 57 (28, 68) 92 (90, 94)
Land 59 (38, 69) 93 (92, 95)
Air, Sea 65 (39, 78) 104 (101, 105)
Air, Land 68 (49, 82) 107 (108, 110)
Sea, Land 59 (34, 70) 95 (93, 96)
All transports 117 (116, 118) 138 (138, 139)
Travel restrictions took eﬀect on the day after the ﬁrst global case onset. The
medians and the non-parametric 95% conﬁdence intervals were obtained from
100 simulation runs.
travel restriction delayed the FPT and FHPT by one week
relative to the no-intervention control case (Table 1). The
peak timemight have been delayed by twoweeks if a single
99% air travel restriction had been imposed (Figure 5C).
The pandemic established in China six months following
the ﬁrst global import to Hong Kong; the strong land con-
nection between the two countries signiﬁcantly enhanced
the number of imported cases. Therefore, suspending
both air and land transport could delay the passage time
by a further one to two weeks, and the peak by about 3.5
weeks (Figure 5A and C).
Travel restrictions on all transport modes most eﬀec-
tively delayed the spread of the H1N1pdm. As shown
in Figure 5, the diﬀerence between 90% and 99% trans-
port reduction was apparent only when all three transport
modes were restricted. Once the volume of all transports
was reduced by 90%, FPT and FHPT were retarded by one
month relative to the control case. 99% travel restriction
delayed the FPT and FHPT by an additional two months
(Table 1). 90% and 99% restriction of all transport modes
deferred the peak for about six weeks (Figure 5A), and 12
weeks (Figure 5C), respectively.
Nevertheless, blocking of sea or land transport alone
cannot prevent disease spread; it did not confer any large
reduction in the ﬁve and seven months’ cumulative ARs.
Even with sea transports reduced by 99%, the peak is
delayed by only one week, relative to the control case
(Figure 5C).
In reducing attack rate, antiviral and hospitalization
administration (AH) proved more promising than travel
restrictions. Neither 90% nor 99% travel restrictions
reduced the epidemic magnitude by more than 10%.
Implementation of AH on a proportion of infected indi-
viduals could halve the peak rate, and reduce the ﬁnal
cumulative ARs (relative to the case of no interven-
tion) from 58% to 37% (Figure 5B and Figure 3B).
However, the peak time of epidemic was only slightly
delayed.
Combining travel restrictions with AH, the impacts
on mitigation are greatly enhanced. Air travel restric-
tions plus AH delayed the peak time by more than three
weeks (Figure 5B and D). A 99% restriction of both air
and land travel delayed the peak time by more than
six weeks (Figure 5D). Imposing AH plus a 99% restric-
tion on all transport modes ﬂattened the epidemic curve
more eﬀectively than did AH plus 90% travel restric-
tion. This strict condition greatly repressed the cumu-
lative ARs, limiting them to around 1% (Figure 3D).
Most importantly, the peak was delayed by approxi-
mately ﬁve months (Figure 5D). Supplemented by AH,
total travel restriction reduced the ﬁnal cumulative AR to
about 14%.
In a milder local scenario (R0 = 1.1), travel restric-
tions not only eﬀectively delayed the H1N1pdm, but also
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Figure 2 Number of imported cases to Hong Kong by diﬀerent transports vs. days with no travel restriction. Day one was taken to be March
11, 2009 (the time of the ﬁrst global case onset). The solid lines represent the average cases; the dotted lines represent the corresponding lower and
upper bounds of the 95% non-parametric conﬁdence intervals.
ﬂattened the incidence curve. Suspension of air travel
remained the best choice among the three transport
modes for repressing the cumulative ARs (Figure 4A
and C). Because the disease transmissions were compara-
tively slow and mild, 90% land import restriction was suf-
ﬁcient to decrease the peak ARs by one-third (Figure 6A
and C). Besides reducing the peak incidence by 25%,
99% restriction of all transport delayed the peak time by
one year following the ﬁrst global import. As shown in
Figure 6B and D, combining AH and travel restrictions
resulted in signiﬁcant peak reduction. Restricting all
travel routes as well as administering AH, the spread
of the local epidemic was halted; the 99% travel restric-
tion retained the ﬁnal cumulative AR at around 0.2%
(Figure 4B and D).
Incoming travel restrictions became less eﬀective
(especially where ARs was concerned) as the contagion
level of the inﬂuenza virus increased to R0 = 1.7. The
rapid disease transmission rate raised the ﬁve months’































































Figure 3Median cumulative attack rates (in %) for diﬀerent control measures at the baseline scenario. The absences and the presences of
the uses of antiviral and hospitalization are illustrated in the left-hand column (A and C) and in the right-hand column (B and D), respectively. The
upper panel (A and B) and the lower panel (C and D) illustrate the 90% and the 99% restriction rescaling, respectively. The medians were obtained
from 100 simulation runs; AH = antiviral and hospitalization.











































































































Figure 4Median cumulative attack rates (in %) for diﬀerent control measures at the mild and the severe scenarios. The absences and the
presences of the uses of the antiviral and hospitalization are illustrated in the left-hand column (A, C, E, and G) and in the right-hand column (B, D,
F, and H), respectively. The ﬁrst and the third panels (A, B, E, and F), and the second and the forth panels (C, D, G, and H) illustrate the 90% and the
99% restriction re-scalings, respectively. The medians were obtained from 100 simulation runs; AH = antiviral and hospitalization.
Imposing 99% restriction on all transport modes
remained suﬃcient to retard the disease spread, deferring
the epidemic peak time by about eight weeks (Figure 6G).
However, under 90% total travel restriction, no signiﬁcant
delay was observed. Supplementation by AH became
more important in this scenario (Figure 4F). Because
the incidence growth was now suppressed by AH, travel
restrictions more eﬀectively repressed the epidemic.
Imposing a 99% restriction on all transport, the seven
months’ cumulative AR was restrained to 4% or less (on
average; Figure 4H), with an approximate delay in peak
time of 12 weeks (Figure 6H).
Eﬀect of R0 from non-local countries
In our study, we varied the R0s from 44 foreign coun-
tries by 20%, and re-evaluated the model outputs. The
changes in foreign R0s aﬀected the number of imported
cases, implying that growth of a local epidemic depends
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Figure 5 Daily incidences for diﬀerent control measures vs. days at the baseline scenario (R0 = 1.4). The absences and the presences of the
uses of antiviral and hospitalization are illustrated in the left-hand column (A and C) and in the right-hand column (B and D), respectively. The upper
panel (A and B) and the lower panel (C and D) illustrate the 90% and the 99% restriction rescaling, respectively. Day one was taken to be March 11,
2009 (the time of the ﬁrst global case onset). The solid lines represent the average cases; the dotted lines represent the corresponding lower and
upper bounds of the 95% non-parametric conﬁdence intervals; AH = antiviral and hospitalization.
upon the passage times of the cases. With reductions of
R0s, imposing restrictions solely on air travel nearly halved
the cumulative ARs. A 99% all-transport restriction was
suﬃcient to halt the local spread (cumulative ARs attain
< 0.1%) after seven months (with or without AH admin-
istration). It maintained the seven months’ cumulative AR
at around 12% even with a 20% increase in R0.
Eﬀect of screening sensitivity at entry border points
Increasing the screening sensitivity at the entry border
slightly retards the local epidemic. In most of the travel
restriction scenarios, the additional FHPTs delay imposed
by the strict 95% screening sensitivity and the relaxed 5%
screening sensitivity was, at most, one to two weeks.
Eﬀect of implementation date on travel restrictions
Imposing travel restrictions ﬁvemonths after the arrival of
the ﬁrst global case is ineﬀective. Even with a total trans-
port reduction of 99%, the reduction in the cumulative
ARs was found to be negligibly small. By comparison,
allowing a three-month gap between arrival of the ﬁrst
global case and imposition of travel restrictions, the
seven-months cumulative AR could be restrained at
around 2% by imposing AH plus 99% restriction on all
transport modes.
Discussion
Non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel restric-
tions are immediate means by which to slow pandemic
growth and to extend the time available for vaccine pro-
duction. Here we collected statistics on arrival numbers
in Hong Kong from 44 countries via air, sea, and land
transport [15]. These data were input to a mathematical
model to evaluate the impact of travel restriction on
diﬀerent scales and by diﬀerent modes, combined with
other government strategies (namely, antivirals and hos-
pitalizations), using the 2009 H1N1pdm as an example.
From our results, we infer that the main connecting
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Figure 6 Daily incidences for diﬀerent control measures vs. days for the mild (R0 = 1.1) and the severe (R0 = 1.7) scenarios. The absences
and the presences of the uses of the antiviral and hospitalization are illustrated in the left-hand column (A, C, E, and G) and in the right-hand
column (B, D, F, and H), respectively. The ﬁrst and the third panels (A, B, E, and F), and the second and the forth panels (C, D, G, and H) illustrate the
90% and the 99% restriction re-scalings, respectively. Day one was taken to be March 11, 2009 (the time of the ﬁrst global case onset). The solid lines
represent the average cases; the dotted lines represent the corresponding lower and upper bounds of the 95% non-parametric conﬁdence
intervals; AH = antiviral and hospitalization.
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route and transport mode between source and destination
(in this instance, air travel from the Americas/Mexico
to Hong Kong), should be targeted for travel restrictions
in a pandemic. This is in addition to suspending trav-
els from large, high-density cities [9]. The emerging 2009
H1N1pdm virus had circulated to most Asian countries,
including densely-populated China, six months after the
ﬁrst global case was reported. The number of imported
cases from China to Hong Kong by land transport there-
after increased exponentially. Reducing land travel could
have signiﬁcantly lowered the number of import trans-
missions. In mild cases, such a restriction reduces the
proportion of peak incidence and delays the peak time by
up to one month. However, suspending travels on a single
route only slightly decreases the peak incidence and the
ﬁnal epidemic size. Restricting either sea or land trans-
port, but not both, confers little advantage in terms of
disease spread.
Travel restrictions may not be eﬀective at reducing
epidemic size. Based on our results, antivirals and hos-
pitalization lower the disease incidence as well as the
ﬁnal epidemic size, but do not prevent the import of
contagious cases or delay the peak time. In most scenar-
ios, imposing AH on a proportion of infected individuals
(< 20%) moderately mitigates the severity of the pan-
demic, reducing the peak incidence by half. Several previ-
ous studies have lauded AH as an eﬀective new epidemic
control measure [5,24,52]. On the other hand, when AH
and travel restrictions are imposed together they supple-
ment each other, further mitigating the pandemic. Since
imposing AH suppresses the growth of local transmission,
the number of local infected sources is reduced, while
travel restrictions prevent the import of fresh infectious
sources. Imposing both interventions thus considerably
extends the peak time. When rigorous restriction on all
transport modes is combined with AH, the delays (peak
appearing after the 10th month) are possible to allow vac-
cine production (i.e. beyond the nine months following
the ﬁrst global import to Hong Kong, during which time
a vaccine program was developed and administered to the
local public).
The eﬀectiveness of travel reductions depends upon
the rate of epidemic growth in diﬀerent foreign countries
[6]. If control measures had been responsible for reduced
transmission in foreign countries (modeled by decreas-
ing the R0s by an average of 20%), a 99% restriction on
all external transport modes might have halted the local
spread. In any case, increasing the screening sensitivity
at the entry border points conferred a one to two week
delay beneﬁt. In reality, some individuals would refuse to
undertake voluntary quarantine despite screening positive
at the border. Such refusals would decrease the sensi-
tivity for screening of quarantined symptomatic cases.
Although the true screening sensitivity may not match
our model settings i.e. 30%, we showed that screening
sensitivity exerts only a secondary eﬀect on epidemic
delay. In the simulation results, the average maximum
number of the screened import cases is 928 (95% conﬁ-
dence interval: 895-961), whereas there are 1400 isolation
beds in 14 major hospitals in Hong Kong, which was
set by the government after SARS [53]. Thus, the con-
trol measure would unlikely entail a capacity problem in
Hong Kong. Our ﬁndings also imply that restrictions be
imposed no later than three months following the ﬁrst
infectious global import. Implementing travel restrictions
at or beyond the end of the ﬁfth month would be almost
useless, because the local epidemic would by then have
evolved to a mature stage, in which disease transmission
would depend on the local exponential increase in cases,
rather than on successive imports.
In the study, we focused on a major city, Hong Kong,
as a high-density, well-traveled region especially suited
to the assessment of travel restrictions. Travel restric-
tions reduced the illness rate only in the event of mild
local disease transmission intensity. In some rural areas
or island countries, the disease transmission intensities
as well as the reproduction numbers remain at low levels
due to limited human mobility and contacts. In addi-
tion, these areas may be infrequently visited by foreign
travelers. Such areas may beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from travel
suspension. In some studies [54,55], beneﬁcial delays in
epidemic establishment have been reported, as a result of
blocking imported cases. Apart from travel restrictions,
there are other public health measures such as regular
hand washing, voluntary quarantine, and school closures
to reduce the impact of inﬂuenza pandemic. Compared
with travel restrictions, school closure is easier to imple-
ment in a community. Past inﬂuenza pandemics have
shown a particular focus on disease transmission in chil-
dren. School closures resulted in a positive eﬀect proven
to be eﬀective in reducing the disease transmission during
the H1N1pdm [28]. Nevertheless, while school closures
and antivirals are good for transmission reduction, they
may not be for buying more time in epidemic prepara-
tion. Closing schools for a long time would induce social
and economical impacts, whereas closing schools for a
short period of time may not be suﬃcient to show eﬀects
on community transmission [56]. Other social distancing
measures like cancelling public gatherings or international
events raise questions about which sizes of public gath-
erings would warrant cancelling. These factors could be
considered in future research.
Several limitations are present in our study. Restrictions
for inbound travel could be beneﬁcial to the pandemic
mitigation but not outbound travel restrictions. Restric-
tions for outbound travel could lead to a worse situation
of a pandemic growth after successive local cases arise.
This is because the departure frequency is more than
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the arrival frequency in Hong Kong (Additional ﬁle 1:
Table S1), and the excess proportion of individuals are
restricted to stay and infect or transmit inﬂuenza virus
to others. So there are increases to the attack rates for
this scenario. Nevertheless, the restrictions on outbound
travel to prevent spreading to other countries is especially
beneﬁcial for those with limited resources of pandemic
prevention. Outbound travel restrictions would be bet-
ter imposed during the containment phase in order to
prevent a global spread of pandemic virus. As our study
does not incorporate the comprehensive traveling net-
work between countries required for a global viewpoint
of pandemic spread, we cannot completely determine the
value of outbound travel restrictions. Moreover, we were
unable to quantify the infection risk for outbound suscep-
tible travelers during their trip abroad because of limited
information regarding their contact patterns. Although
outbound passengers may become infected during their
time abroad, they have nonetheless escaped from local
infections. Our estimated R0 for Hong Kong was 1.4, close
to that of the global median (Additional ﬁle 1: Table S2).
The similar disease transmission intensity between coun-
tries would unlikely incur large infection-risk diﬀerences
between outbound and local susceptible individuals, pro-
vided that the periods of H1N1pdm in diﬀerent coun-
tries are not widely spaced. In addition, all travelers are
assumed to undertake a single-step journey to their des-
tination, and no adjustment for multi-step journeys is
admitted in the model. Nevertheless, previously reported
reports reveal little quantitative diﬀerence between single-
and multi-step travel [57]. More importantly, enforcing
rigorous travel restrictions has been undoubtedly unre-
alistic to date, since such restrictions would substantially
degrade the local economy. In 2009, [58], tourism-related
activities such as accommodation services, retail trade,
transport services, and food and beverage services con-
tributed 2.6% (US$5,200 million) to Hong Kong’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Large travel reductions thus
incur high economic loss. However, increasingly severe
diseases, such as SARS and inﬂuenza A (H1N1), have
entered our society within recent decades, and have
aﬀected wider age groups than have past epidemics. The
emergence of a highly lethal virus is feasible in the near
future. In mitigating viral pandemics, the beneﬁt to be
gained from imposing travel restrictions as an adjunct to
other eﬀective control measures must be balanced against
potential economic impacts. A comprehensive cost bene-
ﬁt analysis will thus be addressed in our future research.
Conclusions
Our study suggested that air travel restrictions should be
priorities for consideration when a new inﬂuenza pan-
demic begins overseas. When the pandemic is initiated in
China or other places where there is land travel to Hong
Kong, land travel restrictions should also be a priority.
If restrictions are able to cover 99% travelers with the
use of antiviral and hospitalization, the resulting pan-
demic delays are possible to allow vaccine production; if
the restrictions cannot cover 90% or more travelers, then
the peak time will happen sooner. In this case, control
measures such as antiviral should be enacted earlier to
alleviate the epidemic growth. To date travel restrictions
have yet to gain widespread social acceptance, but the
beneﬁts may signiﬁcantly outweigh the costs, especially
when a new and highly intrusive virus emerges.
Additional ﬁle
Additional ﬁle 1: Technical appendix.Mathematical model formulation,
impact of other variations, and sensitivity analysis.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
Both authors contributed to the study and performed statistical analysis. They
all drafted the manuscript and approved the ﬁnal version.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Dr. David Wilmshurst and Dr. Hildy Fong for
helpful comments on editing; and Dr. Leonie Zandra Pipe for editing the ﬁnal
manuscript. The authors also thank two reviewers for their valuable and
constructive comments.
Received: 9 November 2011 Accepted: 15 November 2012
Published: 19 NOvember 2012
References
1. Dawood FS, Iuliano AD, Reed C, Meltzer MI, Shay DK, Cheng PY,
Bandaranayake D, Breiman RF, Brooks WA, Buchy P, et al: Estimated
global mortality associated with the ﬁrst 12 months of 2009
pandemic inﬂuenza A H1N1 virus circulation: a modelling study.
Lancet Infect Dis 2012, 12(9):687–695.
2. Centre for Health Protection, HKSAR. Swine and seasonal ﬂu
monitor (volume 2, number 40) week 40. [http://www.chp.gov.hk/
ﬁles/pdf/revised SSFM 7 10 2010.pdf]
3. Centre for Health Protection, HKSAR. Press releases on April 30,
2009. [http://www.chp.gov.hk/en/content/116/16770.html]
4. Grais RF, Hugh G, Glass GE: Assessing the impact of airline travel on
the geographic spread of pandemic inﬂuenza. Eur J Epidemiol 2003,
18(11):1065–1072.
5. Colizza V, Barrat A, Barthelemy M, Valleron AJ, Vespignani A:Modeling
the worldwide spread of pandemic inﬂuenza: Baseline case and
containment interventions. PLoSMed 2007, 4:e13.
6. Hollingsworth TD, Ferguson N, Anderson R:Will travel restrictions
control the international spread of pandemic inﬂuenza? Nat Med
2006, 12:497–499.
7. Cooper BS, Pitman RJ, Edmunds WJ, Gay NJ: Delaying the international
spread of pandemic inﬂuenza. PLoSMed 2006, 3(6):e212.
8. Flahault A, Valleron AJ: Amethod for assessing the global spread of
HIV-1 infection based on air travel.Math Pop Stud 1992, 3:161–171.
9. Hufnagel L, Brockmann D, Geisel T: Forecast and control of epidemics
in a globalizedworld. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2004, 101(42):15124–15129.
10. Flahault A, Vergu E, Boelle PY: Potential for a global dynamic of
inﬂuenza A (H1N1). BMC Infect Dis 2009, 9:129.
11. Brownstein JS, Wolfe CJ, Mandl KD: Empirical evidence for the eﬀect of
airline travel on inter-regional inﬂuenza spread in the United States.
PLoSMed 2006, 3(10):e401.
12. World Health Organization. WHO global inﬂuenza preparedness
plan 2005. [http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/inﬂuenza/
WHO CDS CSR GIP 2005 5.pdf]
Chong and Zee BMC Infectious Diseases 2012, 12:309 Page 12 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/12/309
13. Tomba GS, Wallinga J: A simple explanation for the low impact of
border control as a countermeasure to the spread of an infectious
disease.Mathl Biosci 2008, 214(1–2):70–72.
14. Cioﬁ degli Atti ML, Merler S, Rizzo C, Ajelli M, Massari M, Manfredi P,
Furlanello C, Scalia Tomba G, Iannelli M:Mitigation measures for
pandemic inﬂuenza in Italy: an individual based model considering
diﬀerent scenarios. PLoS ONE 2008, 3(3):e1790.
15. Hong Kong Tourism Board. Visitor arrival statistics. [http://
partnernet.hktourismboard.com/pnweb/jsp/doc/listDocL.jsp?charset=
en&doc id=107560&ﬁlename=VAS+12200]
16. Cowling BJ, Lau L, Wu P, Wong H, Fang V, Riley S, Nishiura H: Entry
screening to delay local transmission of 2009 pandemic inﬂuenza A
(H1N1). BMC Infect Dis 2010, 10:82.
17. Pitman RJ, Cooper BS, Trotter CL, Gay NJ, Edmunds WJ: Entry screening
for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or inﬂuenza: policy
evaluation. BMJ 2005, 331(7527):1242–1243.
18. Bettencourt LMA, Ribeiro RM: Real time bayesian estimation of the
epidemic potential of emerging infectious diseases. PLoS ONE 2008,
3(5):e2185.
19. Hong Kong Information Services Department. News Archives.
HKSAR press releases June 27, 2009. New hospital and clinic
arrangements for human swine ﬂu patients. [www.info.gov.hk/gia/
general/200906/27/P200906270251.htm]
20. Stohr K, Esveld M:Will vaccines be available for the next inﬂuenza
pandemic? Science 2004, 306(5705):2195–2196.
21. Hong Kong Information Services Department. News Archives.
HKSAR press releases December 21, 2009. Human swine inﬂuenza
vaccination programme launched (with photo). [http://www.info.gov.
hk/gia/general/200912/21/P200912210180.htm]
22. Liao Q, Cowling BJ, Lam WWT, Fielding R: Factors aﬀecting intention
to receive and self-reported receipt of 2009 pandemic (H1N1)
vaccine in Hong Kong: A longitudinal study. PLoS ONE 2011, 6(3):
e17713.
23. Wu JT, Riley S, Fraser C, Leung GM: Reducing the impact of the next
inﬂuenza pandemic using household-based public health
interventions. PLoSMed 2006, 3(9):e361.
24. Ferguson N, Cummings D, Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Riley S, Meeyai A,
Iamsirithaworn S, Burke D: Strategies for containing an emerging
inﬂuenza pandemic in Southeast Asia. Nature 2005,
437(7056):209–214.
25. Gani R, Hughes H, Fleming D, Griﬃn T, Medlock J, Leach S: Potential
impact of antiviral drug use during inﬂuenza pandemic. Emerg Infect
Dis 2005, 11(9):1355–1362.
26. Longini IJ, Halloran M, Nizam A, Yang Y: Containing pandemic inﬂuenza
with antiviral agents. Am J Epidemiol 2004, 159:623–633.
27. Vynnycky E, Edmunds W: Analyses of the 1957 (Asian) inﬂuenza
pandemic in the United Kingdom and the impact of school closures.
Epidemiol Infect 2008, 136:166–179.
28. Wu JT, Cowling BJ, Lau EH, Ip DK, Ho LM, Tsang T, Chuang SK, Leung PY,
Lo SV, Liu SH, Riley S: School closure andmitigation of pandemic
(H1N1) 2009, Hong Kong. Emerg Infect Dis 2010, 16(3):538–541.
29. Riley S, Wu JT, Leung GM: Optimizing the dose of pre-pandemic
inﬂuenza vaccines to reduce the infection attack rate. PLoSMed 2007,
4(6):e218.
30. Medlock J, Galvani AP: Optimizing inﬂuenza vaccine distribution.
Science 2009, 325(5948):1705–1708.
31. Tracht SM, Del Valle SY, Hyman JM:Mathematical modeling of the
eﬀectiveness of facemasks in reducing the spread of novelinﬂuenza
A (H1N1). PLoS ONE 2010, 5(2):e9018.
32. U.S. Census Bureau. International Data base (IDB). Total midyear
population by world. [http://www.census.gov/population/
international/data/idb/informationGateway.php]
33. Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. Transport,
communications and tourism statistics. Hong Kong resident
departures by control point. [http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/
FileManager/EN/Content 807/transport.pdf]
34. Greenwood M: On the statistical measure of infectiousness.
J Hyg (Lond) 1931, 31(3):336–351.
35. Abbey H: An examination of the Reed-Frost theory of epidemics.
Hum Biol 1952, 24(3):201–33.
36. Lekone, Phenyo E, Finkenstadt, Barbel F: Statistical inference in a
stochastic epidemic SEIR model with control intervention: Ebola as
a case study. Biometrics 2006, 62(4):1170–1177.
37. Flahault A, Deguen S, Valleron AJ: Amathematical model for the
european spread of inﬂuenza. Eur J of Epidemiol 1994, 10(4):471–474.
38. Flahault A, Letrait S, Blin P, Hazout S, Me´nare´s J, Valleron AJ:Modelling the
1985 inﬂuenza epidemic in France. Stat in Med 1988, 7(11):1147–1155.
39. Rvachev LA, Longini IMJ: Amathematical model for the global spread
of inﬂuenza.Math Biosci 1985, 75:3–22.
40. Longini IM, Fine PEM, Thacker SB: Predicting the global spread of new
infectious agents. Am J Epidemiol 1986, 123(3):383–391.
41. Longini IMJ: Amathematical model for predicting the geographic
spread of new infectious agents.Math Biosci 1988, 90(1–2):367–383.
42. Boelle P, Bernillon P, Desenclos J: A preliminary estimation of the
reproduction ratio for new inﬂuenza A (H1N1) from the outbreak in
Mexico, March-April 2009. Euro Surveill 2009, 14(19):19205.
43. Chowell G, Hengartnerb N, Castillo-Chaveza C, Fenimorea P, Hyman J:
The basic reproductive number of Ebola and the eﬀects of public
health measures: The cases of Congo and Uganda. J Theo Bio 2004,
229:119–126.
44. World Health Organization. Situation updates - Pandemic (H1N1)
2009. [http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineﬂu/updates/en/index.html]
45. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Daily update
on the 2009 inﬂuenza A (H1N1) pandemic. [http://www.ecdc.europa.
eu/en/healthtopics/h1n1/pages/daily update.aspx]
46. Ferguson NM, Cummings DAT, Fraser C, Cajka JC, Cooley PC, Burke DS:
Strategies for mitigating an inﬂuenza pandemic. Nature 2006,
442(7101):448–452.
47. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Questions and answers:
Antiviral drugs, 2009-2010 ﬂu Season. [http://www.cdc.gov/H1N1ﬂu/
antiviral.htm]
48. Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchemez S, Hanage WP, Van Kerkhove MD,
Hollingsworth TD, Griﬃn J, Baggaley RF, Jenkins HE, Lyons EJ, et al:
Pandemic potential of a strain of inﬂuenza A (H1N1): early ﬁndings.
Science 2009, 324(5934):1557–1561.
49. Hong Kong Information Services Department. News Archives.
HKSAR Press Releases on May 2, 2009. Press releases on human
swine ﬂu. [http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200905/02/
P200905020242.htm]
50. Hong Kong Information Services Department. News Archives.
HKSAR press releases from 2009 May 1 to 2009 Dec 31. Press
releases on human swine ﬂu. [http://www.isd.gov.hk/pr/eng/]
51. Yang Y, Sugimoto JD, Halloran ME, Basta NE, Chao DL, Matrajt L, Potter G,
Kenah E, Longini J, Ira M: The transmissibility and control of pandemic
inﬂuenza A (H1N1) Virus. Science 2009, 326(5953):729–733.
52. Longini IM, Nizam A, Xu S, Ungchusak K, Hanshaoworakul W, Cummings
DAT, Halloran ME: Containing pandemic inﬂuenza at the source.
Science 2005, 309(5737):1083–1087.
53. Food and Health Bureau, HKSAR. Report on Hong Kong’s Anti-SARS
Measures. [http://www.fhb.gov.hk/download/services/events/
040623 sars-report/dh ha.pdf]
54. Caley P, Becker NG, Philp DJ: The waiting time for inter-country spread
of pandemic inﬂuenza. PLoS ONE 2007, 2:e143.
55. Bell DM: Non-pharmaceutical interventions for pandemic inﬂuenza,
international measures. Emerg Infect Dis 2006, 12:81–87.
56. Cowling BJ, Lau EH, Lam CL, Cheng CK, Kovar J, Chan KH, Peiris JM, Leung
GM: School closure andmitigation of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Hong
Kong. Emerg Infect Dis 2008, 14(10):1660–1662.
57. Epstein JM, Goedecke DM, Yu F, Morris RJ, Wagener DK, Bobashev GV:
Controlling pandemic ﬂu: the value of international air travel
restrictions. PLoS ONE 2007, 2:e401.
58. Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. Tourism value added by




Cite this article as: Chong and Zee: Modeling the impact of air, sea, and
land travel restrictions supplemented by other interventions on the emer-
gence of a new inﬂuenza pandemic virus. BMC Infectious Diseases 2012
12:309.
